Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Events as property exemplifications' and 'Truth Rehabilitated'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]