Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Philosophy of Mind' and 'Thus Spake Zarathustra'

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91 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]