Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'Ontological Categories' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13134 We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
9916 Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13117 How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
13116 Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
13118 Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
13125 Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
13126 Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
13130 Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
13124 Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13131 The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13123 All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
13115 Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
13119 Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
13135 A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13129 Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23681 The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
23676 A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23678 A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
23677 We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23679 The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]