Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Just and Unjust Wars' and 'Truth and Ontology'

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52 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]