Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'Mathematics without Foundations'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]