Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'Meno'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]