84 ideas
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |