Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'Conditionals'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6334 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
6335 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6339 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6341 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]