Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'works' and 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10397 Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
15384 Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
8481 The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
15385 Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
15383 Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
10398 Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P]