9 ideas
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |