9 ideas
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
15877 | The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |