13 ideas
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| 10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
| 9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
| 9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |