14 ideas
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |