26 ideas
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |