23 ideas
8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |