Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Words without Objects', 'Aristotle on Substance' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
16083 Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
17006 Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
16093 Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]