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All the ideas for 'Words without Objects', 'Goodbye Growing Block' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
19426 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19424 Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
19427 True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
19425 In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
17960 Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
17961 Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG]