25 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |