Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd)', 'The Limits of Reason' and 'Discourse on Metaphysics'

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52 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz]