11 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
14014 | Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski] |