Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Space and Time', 'Value Theory' and 'Events'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14014 Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski]