81 ideas
| 24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
| 24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
| 1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
| 24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
| 24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
| 24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
| 24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
| 16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
| 24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
| 24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
| 1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
| 24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
| 24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
| 24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
| 24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
| 1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
| 13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
| 23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| 1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
| 24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
| 1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
| 24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
| 24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
| 14014 | Space alone, and time alone, will fade away, and only their union has an independent reality [Minkowski] |
| 24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |