66 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |