47 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |