21 ideas
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| 23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
| 23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
| 23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| 23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| 23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| 23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
| 23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |