18 ideas
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |