12 ideas
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
22439 | There are only duties if there are rights, so truth is only for those with a right to it [Constant] |
22440 | Unconditional truth-telling makes a society impossible [Constant] |