29 ideas
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
| 14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
| 14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
| 14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
| 14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
| 14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
| 14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
| 14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
| 14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
| 14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
| 14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
| 14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |