Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions' and 'Understanding and Essence'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]