56 ideas
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |