20 ideas
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
| 13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
| 13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |