Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'The Problem of Consciousness' and 'Letters to Samuel Clarke'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]