19 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |