Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematics without Foundations', 'Mental Events' and 'Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]