64 ideas
| 23064 | So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran] |
| 23072 | Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 23075 | A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran] |
| 9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
| 9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
| 9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
| 10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
| 10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
| 9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
| 10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
| 23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
| 9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
| 9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
| 10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
| 9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
| 23077 | The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 23068 | People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
| 9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 23078 | Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran] |
| 23073 | Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 23076 | If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran] |
| 23065 | If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 23071 | We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran] |
| 23070 | We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran] |
| 23074 | In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran] |
| 23069 | Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran] |
| 23062 | It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran] |
| 23067 | Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran] |
| 23063 | The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran] |