39 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |