18 ideas
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |