Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Mental States', 'Appearance and Reality' and 'Intensional Logic'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
5182 Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
6864 Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
6422 Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
7966 Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
6404 British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
22299 Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
21343 Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
6406 Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]