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All the ideas for 'works', 'Truthmakers' and 'Naturalism in Mathematics'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy]
Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy]
For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy]
An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy]
In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy]
Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy]
Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy]
Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy]
The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy]
Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy]
Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy]