17 ideas
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |