Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meaning and Reference', 'Iteration Again' and 'New system of communication of substances'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]