63 ideas
| 12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
| 12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
| 6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
| 16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
| 11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
| 16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
| 16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
| 16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
| 16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
| 12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
| 16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
| 12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
| 12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
| 16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
| 16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
| 16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
| 16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
| 12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
| 16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
| 16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
| 22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
| 9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
| 12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
| 12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
| 12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
| 12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
| 12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
| 12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
| 12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
| 12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
| 12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
| 16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
| 16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
| 12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
| 12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
| 12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
| 12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
| 12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
| 12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
| 12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
| 12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
| 12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
| 12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
| 12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
| 12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |