Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion' and 'Mathematical Truth'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9935 Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17927 Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
9936 The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]