39 ideas
| 1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
| 6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
| 6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
| 6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
| 6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
| 6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
| 6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
| 6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
| 6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
| 11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
| 6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
| 20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
| 5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
| 5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
| 6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
| 1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
| 6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
| 6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
| 1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
| 17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
| 1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
| 6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
| 6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
| 6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
| 6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
| 6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
| 6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
| 6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
| 6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
| 6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
| 6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
| 1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
| 1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
| 6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
| 1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
| 1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |