Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Mental States', 'The Emergence of Probability' and 'Events as property exemplifications'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
7454 Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
10369 How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
8976 If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
8975 Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
8974 Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
8977 Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
8980 Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
7447 Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
7448 Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
7449 Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
7450 In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
7451 Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
7452 An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
7459 Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]