51 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
15785 | Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |