Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Mind in a Physical World' and 'Action, Reasons and Causes'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
6782 Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
22181 Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]