69 ideas
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |