12 ideas
| 16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 16973 | Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |