12 ideas
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |